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THE GOOD UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND
THE RESEARCH VOCATION OF A
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
PATRICK H. BYRNE
Boston College
Responding to challenges questioning the possibility of distinctively
Catholic higher education, this article seeks to establish an integrated
vision for Catholic universities. Relying on the works of Philip Gleason,
Ignatius of Loyola, and Bernard Lonergan, the author provides a frame-
work for the important research function of Catholic universities and con-
ceives the mission of Catholic institutions of higher education as contribut-
ing to the ongoing, creative, and redemptive work that is ultimately God’s
plan for humanity.
Much recent discussion of the distinctive nature and character ofCatholic higher education has focused upon its special commitments to
the teaching and formation of students, especially with regard to service and
social justice. Increasingly four elements play leading roles in attempts to
define the character and identity of Catholic colleges and universities. Those
four components are: (1) a high level of personal and institutional commit-
ment to excellence in teaching; (2) concern for development of the student’s
whole person in her or his intellectual, ethical and spiritual dimensions; (3)
emphasis on the formation of women and men in service of others; and (4)
promotion of social justice especially in regard to the poor and the
oppressed.
Commitments to teaching, formation of the whole person, service, and
social justice must be indispensable elements in Catholic higher education.
However, excessive focus upon these dimensions alone is too narrow, and will
not provide a sufficient basis for a distinctive style or distinctive institutions of
Catholic higher education, for at least four reasons.
• First, there are a great many non-Catholic colleges and universities that
have strong commitments to some or all four of these elements. To cite just one
illustration, there has been a phenomenal growth of service learning programs
outside of Catholic higher education over the past decade. 
• Second, if Catholic higher education were to be defined exclusively by
means of these four elements, there would be no clear rationale for how the vast
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majority of courses and disciplines – the professional schools, the natural sci-
ences, the social sciences, languages and arts, for example – contribute to such
goals, or why they should be part of a Catholic institution. It is, after all, the aca-
demic and professional disciplines that provide the focal points of classroom
instruction and dictate the standards of academic evaluations that students
receive. 
• Third, casting the identity of Catholic higher education exclusively or even
primarily in terms of undergraduate formation and instruction terms bears an
ominous resemblance to the pattern that Marsden has analyzed in detail in The
Soul of the American University – a pattern that led to the secularization of the
great Protestant universities in the 19th century (Burtchaell, 1998; Marsden,
1994). Catholic institutions of higher education resisted this pattern because
they were run by religious orders, because they had a vision of education that
integrated formation, learning, science and scholarship, and because they were
susceptible to interventions by church authorities. Since the 1960s, all of these
forms of resistance have been seriously weakened (Gleason, 1995; Leahy, 1991;
Marsden, 1994). In light of these changed circumstances, therefore, it would be
unwise to rely solely upon the four elements mentioned above to sustain
Catholic identity at institutions of higher learning.
• Fourth, scientific and scholarly research is constantly transforming both
the content of what is taught and how it ought to be taught. Hence, excessive
concentration upon teaching and formation of students, and especially with
regard to ethics, service, and social justice, as the defining features of Catholic
higher education entirely neglects the activities of faculty members in research
and publication. It also neglects the powerfully important impact that research
has upon the student-directed dimensions of institutions of higher learning.
Furthermore, research and publication are playing ever more important roles in
shaping the sense of identity and self-worth of Catholic colleges and universi-
ties. As they strive to establish high quality and credibility among the best insti-
tutions of higher learning, increasingly Catholic institutions are being evaluated
by national rankings, parents, student applicants, funding sources, and peers at
secular institutions. For all of them, the quality of research and publication is a
prominent factor.
It would, therefore, be a great mistake to neglect to think long and serious-
ly about what sort of role research ought to play in Catholic institutions of high-
er learning precisely as Catholic. As Marsden points out, a major factor in the
demise of the religious identity of the major Protestant universities in America,
including Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Michigan, and Chicago, was their adop-
tion of models of research and the hiring of research faculty that were indiffer-
ent to the faith traditions of their founders. These decisions, as he argues, meant
that the faith traditions became increasingly irrelevant, first to the intellectual
life, and eventually to student teaching, student formation, and indeed to every
aspect of these institutions (Marsden, 1994).
So, while teaching and formation of students’ minds and characters must
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remain a major mission of Catholic colleges and universities, it is not enough to
say that special concern for these alone will suffice in providing the unique iden-
tifying marks of Catholic institutions. The greatest challenge to be faced is how
to think about scientific and scholarly research itself, and how it is intrinsic to
the mission of Catholic institutions. Something over and above teaching, forma-
tion, service, and justice is needed, if Catholic universities are to survive as dis-
tinctive institutions with special and valuable contributions to make to education
and society.  
The challenge confronting Catholic higher education has been given a pow-
erful expression in the closing lines of Philip Gleason’s study of twentieth cen-
tury American Catholic higher education, Contending with Modernity. Gleason
writes:
The task facing Catholic academics today is to forge from the philosophical
and theological resources uncovered in the past half-century a vision that
will provide what Neoscholasticism did for so many years – a theoretical
rationale for the existence of Catholic colleges and universities as a distinc-
tive element in American higher education. (1995, p. 322)
Gleason’s remarks suggest that Neoscholasticism once provided such an inte-
gral vision, and his justly lauded book amply documents just how
Neoscholasticism did that, despite the limitations that led to its inevitable collapse. 
In other words, what is needed is a vision that integrates into a coherent
whole the four student-directed emphases, the various academic and profession-
al disciplines, and the methods of science, scholarship, and criticism. It is pre-
cisely the absence of an integral vision that incorporates the properly academic
dimensions of the higher education as such, which poses the most difficult but
most crying challenge of the present situation for Catholic higher education.
This article endeavors to offer a modest contribution to this enormous task,
and to stimulate conversation about a new integral vision for Catholic higher
education. The article is divided into three sections. The first section provides a
brief survey of Gleason’s analysis of Catholic higher education in the first two-
thirds of the 20th century, and the role that Neoscholasticism played in it. In the
second section, the idea of human history as a good under construction is pro-
posed as a possible model to fill the void left by the eclipse of Neoscholasticism.
The final section explores the ways that Ignatius of Loyola’s exercises in dis-
cernment and Bernard Lonergan’s idea of self-appropriation can contribute to
putting this vision into practice.
GLEASON ON CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
Gleason provides a careful contextualization of how Neoscholasticism came to
play a central role in the identity and practices of American Catholic colleges
and universities in the first two-thirds of the 20th century. His contextualization
proceeds on two fronts. He first traces the transformations of the organizational
structures of Catholic education in the first decades of the century. Then he ana-
lyzes how subsequent Catholic educators turned to Neoscholastic thought in
their attempts to address the problems posed by what was called a “modernist”
vision of reality and humanity. The two, as Gleason explains, were intertwined.
“The organizational modernization … made it possible to institutionalize the
[Neoscholastic] intellectual revival in the colleges, while the revival in turn rein-
forced the Catholic identity of the colleges at a time when they were undergo-
ing a process of institutional modernization” (Gleason, 1995, p. 137).
The early part of the 20th century witnessed the transformation of the struc-
tures of Catholic higher education. At the turn of the century Catholic education
was organized along the lines of what was called the Ratio Studiorum (“Course
of Studies” or “Order of Studies” are possible English translations). The Ratio
Studiorum was the classical model of liberal education.  As one document from
the Jesuit Missouri Province put it, Ratio Studiorum was conceived of as liber-
al education, which “fully develops all the faculties, forms a correct taste, teach-
es the student how to use all his powers to the best advantage, and prepares him
to excel in any pursuit, whether professional or commercial” (Gleason, 1995, p.
53). The principal method of the Ratio Studiorum was education in the classical
languages, Latin and Greek, in order that students might be brought “into con-
tact with the noblest minds of antiquity” (Gleason, 1995, p. 5) and acquire a
“mastery of [Ciceronian] Latin” (p. 53) in order to achieve “eloquentia perfec-
ta, the ability to speak Latin fluently and with persuasive power” (Gleason,
1995, p. 5). This cultivation was in itself a noble end but, especially among
Jesuits, it was conceived of as providing the preparation for a still higher end,
namely: the study of philosophy and ultimately theology. Originally this meant
the philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of Thomas Aquinas (Farrell, 1938),
but by the 18th century the understanding and even teaching of both had fallen
into much disarray. Even so, this overall, integrated structure of studies was
regarded as “an almost perfect synthesis of religious and educational values”
(Gleason, 1995, p. 35).
In other words, the goal of the Ratio Studiorum was the production of the
whole person, a cultivated person, where “cultivated” meant a culturally specif-
ic model of human perfection, the classical ideal. In his study of the founding of
the Society of Jesus, John O’Malley, S.J. has reminded us of how the first Jesuits
were instrumental in developing this Ratio Studiorum as the model of college
education.  It was indeed a monumental achievement in its day, frequently bring-
ing order to the chaos of what passed for education (O’Malley, 1993). That it
survived for over 300 years testifies to its achievement and value.  It should be
noted that this Ratio Studiorum and its ideal of studying the classics also formed
the original core of the Protestant colleges that evolved into the leading
American universities. The classical conception of higher education in the
Protestant colleges survived well into the 19th century. As the Protestant col-
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leges began the transition to universities, they did so by replacing this classical,
formation ideal of their institutions with the ideal of the research university bor-
rowed from the great European universities. The transformation of the church-
related Protestant colleges into thoroughly secular institutions was centrally
bound up with abandonment of the classical Ratio Studiorum conception of the
aims and goals of higher education.
Gleason also points out that in its original 16th century European setting, the
emphasis on classical languages and cultivation had eminently practical value,
since mastery of Latin was required for careers in the church, law, medicine, and
government. However, in the context of a modern American society undergoing
massive transformations, this original integration of practical and cultural values
was severed. By the late 19th century, the American Jesuits, who became the
staunchest defenders of the Ratio Studiorum model, had to base their arguments
on the cultural values alone. This resulted in the almost myopic disregard of
needs for practical education (Faherty, 1968; Gleason, 1995).
The way in which the Ratio Studiorum was organized around classical lan-
guages also had another serious negative consequence. Jesuit faculty members
were expected to teach all the subjects offered in a given year of studies; for
example, classical languages, English, mathematics, and history. Thus Jesuits
became generalists in language instruction and character formation, but this “pre-
vented them from becoming real scholars in any field” (Gleason, 1995, p. 58).
Such problems eventually led to a major reform movement in Catholic edu-
cation. These reforms included a separation of preparatory education from the
college education proper, and an increasing accommodation of programs of
instruction that better prepared graduates to gain employment in the new indus-
trial and bureaucratic society. The Protestant institutions had undertaken similar
sorts of reforms two generations earlier. These reforms led to the erosion of the
Ratio Studiorum and left Catholic institutions of higher learning in need of a
new model for integrating its course of studies with its faith commitments and
its goals of educating the whole person.
That new integrating vision was supplied, Gleason argues, by the renais-
sance of Neoscholastic philosophy beginning around 1920. By the late 18th cen-
tury, the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas had been largely aban-
doned by Catholics and non-Catholics alike in favor of Cartesian and
Enlightenment philosophical trends. The revival of interest, and the historical,
scholarly studies that gave it intellectual substance, were stimulated by Pope
Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1879, Aeterni Patris. The encyclical endorsed the
virtues of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas for establishing “Catholic teach-
ing on a solid intellectual foundation” (Gleason, 1995, p. 105). The
Neoscholastic revival was also spurred by earlier papal condemnations of
Modernism and Americanism. Decades later these authoritarian motivations
would contribute to the demise of Neoscholasticism. The loss of its vitality was
made painfully evident in John Tracy Ellis’s stinging critique in 1955 of the anti-
intellectualism of American Catholicism. Many Catholic college faculty of the
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1960s still bristled at the anti-intellectualism of this period, and felt the breath
of fresh air that followed the demise of Neoscholasticism.
Despite the eventual negative impact of the authoritarian promotions of
Neoscholasticism, their initial effect was to set off an era of intellectual vitality
throughout the Catholic community, and especially in American Catholic col-
leges and universities. By the end of the 1920s, “Neoscholasticism had become
a ‘school philosophy’ that served for Catholic colleges very much the same
functions that Scottish common sense philosophy and Baconianism served for
Protestant colleges in the first half of the nineteenth century” (Gleason, 1995, p.
105). Neoscholasticism offered a metaphysical synthesis of the connections
among knowledge, reality, God, the natural universe, the human place in it, and
the norms of human conduct. By way of contrast, in the modern philosophies
and worldviews that displaced Scholasticism’s integral vision, these elements
became fragmented; or they held to one or another sort of reductionism; namely,
that all human experiences, meanings, behaviors, and truths can be reduced to
laws of matter in motion. On the other hand, because Neoscholasticism under-
stood each human person to be part of the intelligible unity of all reality, it consti-
tuted “the basis for a system of personal and social ethics in which moral obliga-
tion flowed, not from the teachings of religion, not even from the command of God,
but from God’s being, the structure of reality itself” (Gleason, 1995, pp. 117-118).
As such, Neoscholasticism also offered a way of integrating faith and reason: 
The God-centeredness, the emphasis on the supernatural dimension, the
insistence on viewing all things sub specie aeternitatis [from an eternal per-
spective], which underlay the whole movement of the Catholic revival and
constituted its most important feature, involved much more than rationality,
important as that was.… For God’s being did more than illuminate the
human intellect. Once understood, the divine plan for humankind required
action, a commitment to its fulfillment on the part of every believer. And
even more important, God’s infinite perfection simultaneously awakened
spiritual longings that could be satisfied only by personal union with God.
To learn more of God and God’s creation was not merely to be called to
apostolic action; it was to be drawn more powerfully to God as the object
of contemplation, of worship, of prayer, of devotion, of the soul’s desire for
spiritual fulfillment. (Gleason, 1995, pp. 121-122)
Gleason’s allusions to the intimate connections between the study of
Aquinas’ thought, and the intellectual, literary, aesthetic, and mystical dimen-
sions of the Catholic renaissance are borne out in the careers of such figures as
Flannery O’Connor and Thomas Merton. In addition, Gleason narrates in some
detail how Dorothy Day, Peter Maurin, and the emergence of the Catholic
Worker and the Catholic Action movements of that period were also dependent
in important ways on the integral vision that came out of this Neoscholastic
revival (Gleason, 1995).
Aquinas’ thought also contained an integral view of what science is, what
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sorts of sciences there might be, and how they are related to the larger metaphys-
ical scheme of things. Hence, it was recognized early on by certain key figures
that Neoscholasticism could also supply a context for research, as well as for the
teaching and formation of students (Gleason, 1995). Frequently alumni who
were educated during the late stages of that period, in spite of the obscurities of
the content and the often poor quality of instruction they received, still testify
that it gave them a greatly cherished orientation for the rest of their lives.
This survey of Gleason’s study is not intended as an expression of nostalgia
or an exhortation for a return to Neoscholasticism. Neoscholasticism declined
because of its own limitations, and because it was often supported by appeals to
authority that alienated many students and faculty alike. Moreover, the versions
of Neoscholasticism available at that time, even at their best, were not up to the
task of integrating new and rapidly emerging forms of knowledge, or the rise of
professional training, or the new methods and standards of research demanded
by these developments. Rather, this summary is intended to deepen appreciation
of the challenge that Gleason says we now face. In its own time, at its best,
Neoscholasticism offered a compelling vision integrating the learning, science,
scholarship, faith, ethical norms, commitment to justice, and a rich spiritual life.
A comparable vision is needed today if the character of Catholic institutions of
higher learning is to be sustained.
THE GOOD UNDER CONSTRUCTION AS A NEW
INTEGRAL VISION
With a view toward the development of a new integral vision, this section draws
upon the philosophical and theological resources developed by the late Jesuit
thinker, Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan was himself a product of both the era of
the Ratio Studiorum and the Neoscholastic revival. He learned not only to read
but to lecture in Latin, if not in a Ciceronian style, at least in an unmistakable,
almost comical sing-song rhythm that is preserved on tapes and CDs. His early,
unpublished works reflect much of the exuberance of the Catholic renaissance
and its hopes for transforming modern society. In his earliest published scholar-
ly work, he also contributed to the historical, scholarly retrieval of Aquinas’
thought. 
But Lonergan also recognized that there were severe limitations to the
abstract and excessively deductive character of Neoscholastic metaphysics, its
sometimes complacent self-assurance, and its classicist indebtedness to the cul-
turally limited ideals of the Ratio Studiorum. Most importantly, he came to the
conclusion that Neoscholastic metaphysics could not do justice to the rich com-
plexities of human subjectivity, to the dynamism of the evolving natural uni-
verse, or to the dynamics of human history. He frequently quoted the comment
of historian Christopher Dawson that Neoscholasticism was not up to the task of
thinking on the level of history. Early on, therefore, he set about searching for
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an approach to philosophical and theological issues that would overcome these
various limitations, but would still retain what was best and most admirable
from the classical and Neoscholastic visions of an integration of education and
scholarship.
One of Lonergan’s ideas in crafting this new vision is what he called self-
appropriation. The ultimate goal of self-appropriation, as Lonergan conceived of
it, is coming to an intimate knowledge of oneself as participating in the unfold-
ing of the grand drama of cosmic and human history. Every human being is born
into a unique set of circumstances and experiences fashioned by the history that
preceded her or his birth. Individuals’ responses to their circumstances and expe-
riences determine both the kind of person they will become, and also determine
what their contribution to history will be – what circumstances will be passed on
to those who follow. Everything depends upon the ways people respond. For
Lonergan, self-appropriation is a matter of becoming ever more attentive to
these responses.
Lonergan’s view of the dynamics of history can be aptly characterized by a
phrase from O’Connor: “the good in us is under construction.” In her
Introduction to a Memoir of Mary Ann, O’Connor (1961) offers a meditation on
how it is that God draws good out of what seem to humans to be hopeless imper-
fections and tragedies. Lonergan’s understanding of history resonates with that
of O’Connor, but at the same time he nuances it by identifying three dynamics
that are constantly interacting to produce the human condition. Those three
dynamics are: first, the progressive evolution of the universe and its continua-
tion in human intellectual advancements; second, the breakdowns and corrup-
tions of those human achievements due to what he termed the “biases”; and
third, the ongoing process of divine love redeeming humanity from humanly
originated failures and catastrophes. Human history has an unknown destiny.
Whatever that destiny will turn out to be, Lonergan argued, it will be brought
about through the complex interactions of these three dynamics. In effect,
Lonergan forged an integral vision based, not on a metaphysics of being as
Neoscholasticism did, but on a dynamic conception of history as the good under
construction. However in his early works, up to and including Insight, he was
still attempting to formulate this new integral vision in terms of a metaphysics.
To be more specific, in Lonergan’s view human life and human history are
overwhelmingly a matter of interpersonal relations and interactions. These inter-
actions take place within the settings of informal patterns and customs, as well
as within more formalized institutional structures. At their best, these informal
patterns and formal institutions serve to assist people in meeting their deepest
needs and realizing their noblest goals. According to Lonergan, such patterns
and institutions originate in the creativity and adaptability of human intelli-
gence. New ways of organizing to solve problems and meet needs spring from
human perceptiveness, inquisitiveness, and that spark of insight that discovers
new ways of doing things. Likewise the array of meanings that underpin, enrich,
constitute, and regulate human interactions and institutions also spring from the
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intelligences of human beings, according to Lonergan. The intelligence and will-
ingness of millions of humans are required to sustain, communicate, and adapt
these patterns to the ever shifting vicissitudes of daily living. In Lonergan’s
view, acts of human intelligence abound in all cultures, all ages, all walks of life.
People must use their intelligences to learn how things get done in any commu-
nity, and to learn what its members hold dear and what they abhor, before they
themselves can take on the responsibility for either sustaining or changing its
intuitions. Hence, in addition to the acts of intelligence involved in assimilating
already existing patterns and devising innovations, the good under construction
is also the product of what Lonergan called critical and reflective judgments that
form the basis for the criticism and reform of human meanings and social
arrangements. In his view, human personal and communal life is an ongoing
construction in which questions, and intelligent and critical responses to them,
play a leading role.
But of course human affairs are not solely products of human intelligence
and critical reflection. Besides the intelligent, reasonable and ethical compo-
nents in human interactions and institutions, there are the undeniable facts of
ignorance, injustice, absurdity, and cruelty rife throughout our dealings with one
another. In reality a great many human decisions are defective in intelligence
and lacking in critical reflection. Worse yet, those who suffer the effects of unin-
telligent, uncritical, unethical decisions, find their suffering to be meaningless
and unintelligible – which only increases their suffering. This lack of intelligi-
bility produces in the recipients themselves cycles of frustration, anger, bitter-
ness, hatred, disaffection, revenge, violence, alienation, and increased prejudice
of all kinds. Hence human evil also has a dynamism. Lonergan was most
emphatic that any adequate understanding of history must also take into account
the cycles of unintelligibility and injustice in the human condition. He was cer-
tainly not unique in this emphasis. What is unique is his notion that we ought to
regard the dynamism of injustice, alienation, disruption, and violence in human
affairs as a matter of “bias.” The word, bias, has a variety of meanings. In
Lonergan’s technical sense, bias is a fundamental distortion of and a deviation
from the creative, constructive, and critical employment of intelligence and eth-
ical authenticity. He identified four fundamental forms of bias (Lonergan, 1992),
but there are of course many varieties of each. When speaking as a theologian,
Lonergan equated bias with sin. So, in addition to the dynamism of the good
under construction that comes from intelligent human actions, there are also the
corrupting dynamisms that result from the distorting biases.
Ideally, unencumbered human intelligence would produce gradual but ever
increasing improvement of the human condition – such was the optimism of the
Enlightenment that still underpins the modern secular universities. However, the
realities of bias, senselessness, and violence pose profound questions about the
ultimate outcome of human history. Is the outcome of O’Connor’s and
Lonergan’s “good under construction” really good after all? Will the good of
intelligent solutions to personal and social problems outweigh the social and his-
328 Catholic Education/March 2004
Byrne/GOOD UNDER CONSTRUCTION 329
torical destructiveness of unintelligence and malice?  Or will human efforts to
live intelligently and ethically ultimately be submerged in the rising tide of
human evil? Here Lonergan, like O’Connor, bears witness to yet a third dynam-
ic in human affairs — the healing and redemptive power of God’s uncondition-
al grace and self-sacrificing love. It is love in this profound sense that empow-
ers family members to forgive one another the wrongs done unto them. It is
unconditional love that motivates people to take on exceptional responsibilities
to care for victims and repair devastation when they have no ethical obligation
to do so. It is unconditional love that motivates people to renew and deepen their
loyalties and to dedicate themselves to reform and renewal of intuitions and
communities in the wake of scandals. It is unconditional love for students that
can motivate teachers to keep trying when immaturity or apathy makes their
efforts seem futile; and love that makes teachers ever more sensitive to what
might really be interfering with a student’s learning. It is love of a field of study
that can sustain scientists’ and scholars’ commitments to life-long lines of inquiry
despite indifference, criticism, and even ridicule. Unconditional love when actu-
ally practiced is more powerful than injustice, frustration, and bitterness.
One of the more profound aspects of Lonergan’s work is his way of situat-
ing love, not as a blind, irrational force in opposition to intelligence and ration-
ality, but rather as intrinsically related to the creative and normative role that
intelligence, critical reflection, and freedom play in human history. He identifies
love as the power that heals and overcomes the human resistances to novel
inquiries, and turns the objectives of intelligence and criticism into passionately
embraced desiderata. Because God’s grace and unconditional love, no less than
human intelligence and human injustice, are real and present throughout human
history, we can dare to hope that this complex interplay of intelligence, bias, and
love will together lead to the construction of an ultimate good in which, to par-
aphrase T. S. Eliot and Julianna of Norwich, “all shall be well and all manner of
thing will be well.”
In his philosophy of self-appropriation, Lonergan envisions the work of sci-
entific and scholarly research as playing a very special role in this historical
process of the good under construction. Research is also a matter of adding new
understanding to the heritage of scientific and scholarly thought that has gone
before, advancing it, criticizing it, revising it through the interplay of questions
and answers that are the heart of academic and scientific research. The intelli-
gent improvement of the human community is always a matter of adding our
own new insights to those that have gone before. Although university professors
frequently feel that their work is not appreciated and in vain, it remains true that
the types of insights that originate in academic and scientific research have their
own distinctive and wide-ranging impacts upon the human condition. This is
evident in the rapid changes in our technology, and in the more gradual transfor-
mation of organizational, economic, and political structures that have flowed
from ideas generated in universities over the last century. If Catholic colleges
and universities are to make distinctive contributions to the good under con-
struction, then they need to be putting forth research that incorporates distinc-
tively Catholic resources. One way of doing so is the topic of the next section.
SELF-APPROPRIATION, IGNATIAN DISCERNMENT
AND INTERDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE
For Lonergan the ultimate goal of self-appropriation is to understand and accept
oneself as a responsible agent in these dynamics of history. It would seem, there-
fore, that self-appropriation would require one to become a historian. While
Lonergan recognized the great importance of the study of history, he did not
organize his approach to self-appropriation around the study of history as such.
Instead, he began much more modestly, inviting people to engage in a series of
exercises intended to bring about a heightened, personal awareness of and com-
mitment to the activities of their own conscious living. Since in his view the
good of history is brought about, little by little, by women and men engaging in
these activities, it was Lonergan’s belief that deepening awareness of and com-
mitment to them would form the core of a method for promoting the gradual
transformation of the world.
Lonergan’s approach to self-appropriation can be compared to Ignatius of
Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises. In particular, there are strong affinities between
what Lonergan means by self-appropriation and Ignatius’s notion of “discern-
ment.” Ignatius’s spiritual exercises form a progressive structure intended to
lead to a fundamental decision – “election” is Ignatius’s term. In aid of that deci-
sion, Ignatius offers a series of rules or guidelines intended to help one make an
examination of one’s consciousness (Lonergan, 2002). The purpose of this
examination is to “discern the movements of spirits” in one’s own conscious-
ness. Ignatius himself began to be aware of the often subtle differences between
the promptings of good spirits and bad spirits — feelings which were stirring
within his consciousness — when he was recuperating from wounds suffered in
battle. Out of these personal experiences of discernment and election, Ignatius
gradually composed a written guide for the sake of “helping souls” that eventu-
ally became his Spiritual Exercises.
Similarly, Lonergan proposes a series of exercises that enable people to
become gradually more attentive to the acts by means of which they participate
in, respond to, and contribute to the human historical good under construction.
The first stages of Lonergan’s exercises are meant to assist one in paying
ever closer attention to the stirrings of wonder and inquiry. Sometimes experi-
ences of inquiry and wonder are quite vivid, but sometimes they are subtle and
barely noticed. Lonergan’s exercises are aids in realizing the pervasive presence
and importance of the inquiring spirit in all aspects of personal and profession-
al life. Self-appropriation involves recognition of the recurring presence of
inquiries. It also involves becoming more aware of the ways that one employs
sensations, imaginations, memories, and insights in responding to these
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inquiries. But it also leads ever more to the discernment of the subtle and easily
disregarded ways that inquiries will continue to linger when they have not been
answered intelligently. Such discernment brings awareness of reflective dissat-
isfactions with inadequate answers and the corresponding desire for well-sup-
ported judgments. It brings to attention the ways in which one tends to stifle the
calls of inquiries. These exercises in self-appropriation are intended to heighten
our awareness of barely noticed questions. They also aim to make us more atten-
tive to imaginative efforts to find intelligent answers to inquiries. By means of
these exercises, a person can gradually notice the difference between arriving at
genuine answers, and the ways in which she or he tends to smother and stifle
intelligent inquiries, and to surrender critical integrity. In the movement of his-
tory, inquiry and wonder are the source of intellectual creativity. By means of
exercises of self-appropriation, people can come to know themselves as intelli-
gent, inquiring, critical, and meaning-originating agents.
Lonergan’s own self-appropriation of inquiry led him to the realization that
human inquiry is unlimited. There is nothing that we do not have the capacity to
inquire about and the desire to understand correctly. Because each and every
human has an unlimited capacity for wonder, self-appropriation of inquiry is the
appropriation of one of the fundamental ways in which humans are drawn ever
onward to build up the good under construction, and one of the fundamental
ways in which people are drawn to God.
Inquiry, and all the intelligent innovations and critical methods that follow
from it, are by no means restricted to people involved in university education
and research. But inquiry is undeniably at the heart of university life. Inquiry is
indispensable to all genuine learning and creative teaching. Inquiry is the driv-
ing force of the scientific and scholarly research that yields the ideas, theories,
and methods eventually taught in classrooms, laboratories, and pre-professional
practicum settings. For those engaged in the various vocations in university life,
therefore, self-appropriation would especially be a matter of reflecting upon the
structures of inquiry characterizing our various disciplines.
One of Lonergan’s more sophisticated claims is that when people concrete-
ly turn to self-appropriation of the disciplinary structures of inquiry, sooner or
later they will confront the fact that everyone holds fundamental commitments
which affect their work. Fundamental commitments run deeper than the funda-
mental propositions that people believe or even know to be true. Fundamental
commitments are basic ways of living, ways of being-in-the-world. In their liv-
ing, people embody tacit assumptions about what can be or cannot be real, about
what could or could not be known, about which values outweigh all others,
about the ultimate meaning of life, and about how they align themselves with
respect to religious issues. Such fundamental commitments are also embedded
in the methods of disciplines as well as in the recesses of personalities. They
affect how people observe, how they read, how they think and argue, what they
choose to teach and publish, and ultimately what they choose to pass on and
thereby affect the course of history. Eventually, self-appropriation of university
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vocations will lead to reflection on and discussion of such fundamental commit-
ments and their ultimate consequences for faculty members themselves and for
their impacts upon human history.
But those who find their callings in university professions are not free from
distortions of inquiry and intelligence, even though they may profess that their
fundamental commitment is to the noble goal of always seeking truth. As
Lonergan notes, there are forms of blindness and prejudice in the fundamental
commitments that are peculiar to academic work. These subtle and sophisticat-
ed distortions can become entrenched in the academy by means of methods and
fads. The Ratio Studiorum itself held a deep prejudice against modern science.
Neoscholasticism had a blindness to the challenges of thinking in evolutionary
and historical terms. Positivism is prejudiced against concepts and arguments
that do not involve a direct appeal to empirical data – and  especially against reli-
gious meanings. The Enlightenment concepts of reason and truth are now being
exposed for bias toward domination and control. In Freudian thought, there is a
biased disregard of higher motivations and a reductionism of all human behav-
ior to the lowest of mechanisms. Certain schools of economics hold marketplace
efficiency as the supreme value, while their socialist and social justice critics
seem blind to even the limited legitimacy of market efficiency. Widely held
views about how academic criticism should be conducted, as set forth by will-
ful proponents of skepticism, falsificationism, or deconstructionism, are subtly
at variance with the realities of spontaneous human inquiry as disclosed by sus-
tained self-appropriation. And so on. 
When the fundamental commitments embedded in research methods and
academic fads are contaminated with bias, they have wide ranging social and
historical impacts. The methods lead to research findings and publications.
When introduced into classrooms, these findings affect the hearts and minds of
those we teach. When introduced into corporate boardrooms or governmental
hearings, they form the bases of policy decisions. Precisely because of the pres-
tige of universities, distortions in methods and fads lead to contamination of
society at large. In this way university research can also play a profound role in
the second dynamic of human history, the breakdowns and destructions of those
human achievements due to biases. Precisely because of the wide ranging
impacts of our academic researches, it is necessary to be concerned about the
ways in which academic biases, no less than academic achievements, leave their
deep marks upon the human condition. Hence, there is a great responsibility for
self-appropriation, not only of the authentic inquiry that is at the heart of our
academic methods, but also of the academic biases that have surreptitiously
become incorporated into the methods and the personalities of those engaged in
university research. 
While bias is the second of Lonergan’s dynamics, love is the third dynamic
in his account of the good under construction of human history. Ultimately, fun-
damental commitments are matters of what one loves most highly and, con-
versely, abhors most strongly. This claim may sound absurd to a university con-
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stituency that has come to think of itself as fundamentally committed to ration-
ality, and as opposed to irrational forces like love. But this reaction is itself the
product of the Enlightenment’s portrayal of reason, a product of its stories about
the great heroes and martyrs of reason, and the great crimes against reason by
the powers of religion, superstition, and tradition (Byrne, in press; Segre, 1998).
The effect of such portrayals is to cultivate a love of the sort of reasoning mod-
eled in the Enlightenment’s narratives, and to engender enmity against its antag-
onists. There are of course many variations upon this theme of how academi-
cians acquire the basic loves and ressentiments that motivate and structure their
teaching and research. Bondi (1993), for example, offers a poignant account of
how this narrative affects the life of a scholar, and how God’s love can heal and
transcend it. Kuhn (1970) has argued that all “normal” scientific research oper-
ates within paradigms inculcated in graduate training, and that the acquisition of
a paradigm is comparable to a religious conversion– comparable to falling in
love, as Lonergan (1972) would claim.
Perhaps the most profound of all current academic biases is the bias against
love. To some extent this is understandable. There is naïve love that avoids hard,
critical questions and prefers to see reality according to its romantic vision.
There is the historical record of malevolent deception and exploitation of peo-
ple (especially women) in the name of love. Such facts rightly give rise to a
healthy suspicion about the deceptions and false claims in the name of love. But
these facts have also led to academic forms of bias against the reality of love
itself. It has come to pass that love of poetry, love of the history of 15th centu-
ry France, love of the interior workings of subatomic particles, love of under-
standing the ups and downs of commercial life, or love of God have been
deemed irrelevant to and even antithetical to academic pursuits. Nevertheless, it
is precisely these sorts of loves that do in fact absorb professors into the disci-
plines and interests that they pursue as members of universities.
Hence university researchers, almost in spite of themselves, do have funda-
mental commitments, and they are affairs of love. The difficulty is that people
have multiple loves, divided loves, and even as St. Augustine would claim, dis-
ordered loves. In some cases people are quite aware of their loves and, as well,
of their ressentiments. Yet in many cases loves and ressentiments operate
beyond conscious awareness or control. If this is so, then there is a great need
for self-appropriation of loves and enmities, and of their workings in people’s
lives, including university lives. Because people have multiple and frequently
conflicting loves, sustained discernment is needed in order to notice differences
among loves, to understand and critically disentangle loves, and to make an
“election” for the forms of love that are more authentic.
The discernment of loves has been the aim of the world’s great spiritual
practices. Ignatius’s spiritual exercises draw upon the resources of the Christian
and Jewish scriptural tradition and are structured so as to deepen the exercant’s
consciousness of the presence of God’s unconditional love in her or his life.
God’s unconditional love is the love of everything about every thing. As such, it
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is a love that includes and goes beyond all partial loves. Ultimately, human love
is disordered when some partial, conditional love has become one’s fundamen-
tal commitment, and no proper place has been left for any other love. In the spir-
itual exercises, one’s other loves are gradually experienced in their relation to
God’s unconditional love. The other loves are gradually recognized, now as
enfolded in God’s love, or now as distorted into ressentiments, or now pervert-
ed into means of fleeing from unconditional love. For Ignatius, this intensifica-
tion of knowledge of oneself in terms of one’s actual loves in the light of God’s
unconditional love sets the stage for a decision, an “election” for unconditional
love as one’s own fundamental commitment. While there may be a first, critical
moment in a person’s life, though not necessarily in an explicitly religious con-
text, when he or she chooses unconditional love, this is a decision that needs to
be made over and over (Haughton, 1980). Repetition of the exercises facilitates
such growth. As individuals grow toward a life of unconditional love, they grad-
ually come to recognize ever more subtle incompatibilities between uncondi-
tional love and their own disordered loves. Likewise, they come to recognize in
very personal ways how the talents and learnings they have acquired can be used
in new ways in the service of unconditional love. This can be especially true for
those engaged in university life.
Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises (1914) offer a sketch of the self-appropriation
of the third of Lonergan’s dynamics of history – the healing power of God’s
unconditional and self-sacrificing love. In effect, the Ignatian exercises are
intended to lead the exercant to a personal commitment (“election”) to God’s
love as revealed in Christ Jesus (O’Malley, 1993). Yet such self-appropriation
can and does take place in other non-Ignatian, Catholic spiritual practices, as
well as in non-Catholic Christian, and in the great non-Christian spiritual tradi-
tions. These are the spiritual practices and disciplines that have stood the test of
time, because they have the degree of integrity and complexity that is demand-
ed in order to foster the growth of human beings into living ever more fully
according to the call of unconditional love.
The great Catholic spiritual traditions are, therefore, indispensable to the
project of self-appropriation for faculty members in a Catholic university.
Moreover, in the new context of pluralism, the non-Catholic spiritual traditions
are equally indispensable. None of these spiritual traditions, however, was
developed with the specific challenges of contemporary academic research in
mind. Hence, there is need for something that will supplement the strengths of
the great spiritual practices with exercises designed to appropriate how to syn-
thesize a fundamental commitment to unconditional love properly with a funda-
mental commitment to unrestricted inquiry. Lonergan observed that what is
needed is a supplementary structure of reflection adapted to the academic voca-
tion that makes fundamental commitments “a topic” for dialogue (Lonergan,
1972, p. 253).
The first and most important thing to say about genuine dialogue concern-
ing fundamental commitments is that it is very difficult, because fundamental
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commitments are so deeply personal. People have differing fundamental com-
mitments, and they have deep and personal reasons and loves grounding those
differences. Real conversation of the kind needed for a new integral vision for
Catholic universities cannot run away from those differences. Nor can it expect
that the reality and profundity of those differences can be met adequately by the
forms of indifference that can sometimes masquerade in lip service to tolerance
or respect for cultural diversity. Real conversation about fundamental commit-
ments has to take seriously the depth of the personal loves and ressentiments that
underlie fundamental commitments, one’s own as well as those of others. It has
to acknowledge the personal challenges that will arise from real dialogue at this
level.
The second thing to say about real dialogue about fundamental commit-
ments is that it succeeds best when it operates in an indirect mode. Chalmers
(1982) noted that positivism was hit by two very different, powerful intellectu-
al refutations in the 1930s, but that neither of these had much effect on the fun-
damental attitudes of positivists. In part this is because the refutations were
merely intellectual and did not go to the level of the personal reasons that led to
commitments to positivism. But it also has to do with the fact that both refuta-
tions were frontal assaults. Real conversation about fundamental commitments
works best when diverse groups of scholars come together and talk in an atmos-
phere of respect and love, not about their fundamental commitments, but about
topics and issues of interest and concern to all involved.
There is nothing automatic about these interpersonal processes, however. A
great deal depends upon the personal qualities that the participants bring to these
conversations. Such conversations work best when the participants come with
genuine intellectual interests in learning about something from people outside
their own specialties. They also depend upon the presence of participants for
whom unconditional love is really operative, whether it is named as such or not.
They also depend upon the sense that these conversations will ultimately pro-
duce some sort of contribution—such as the design of a new course, publication
of a volume, or organization of a conference. In other words, these conversations
work best when they are perceived as leading to some contribution to the good
under construction. When these factors are present, much good results.
But these indirect conversations only surface fundamental commitments
and the ways they enter into particular issues. Here, something in addition to
intellectual content, and even something more than positive personal qualities
and friendship, is needed. That something more is a structured set of exercises
to actually take the next step and reflect upon the fundamental commitments
themselves.
Now Lonergan has some very interesting ideas concerning what he called
“Dialectic” that might contribute to such a structure (Lonergan, 1972). Consider
a comment drawn once again from Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises. In its simplic-
ity, Ignatius’s comment communicates something that Lonergan derived from
him regarding his notion of dialectic. The comment comes from what Ignatius
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called “The Presupposition” of the Spiritual Exercises. Ignatius writes:
In order that both [the director] who is giving the Spiritual Exercises, and
he [or she] who is receiving them, may more help and benefit themselves,
let it be presupposed that every good Christian is to be more ready to save
[their] neighbor’s proposition than to condemn it. If [the director] cannot,
let [the director] inquire how he [or she] means it; and if he [or she] means
it badly, let [the director] correct him [or her] with charity. If that is not
enough, let [the director] seek all the suitable means to bring him [or her]
to mean it well, and save himself [or herself]. (1914, para. 22)
Ignatius’s Presupposition and Lonergan’s notion of Dialectic presuppose
meaning and value are to be sought in the expressions of everyone that we
encounter, and that the function of dialogue and dialectic is to find that meaning
and build upon it. Ignatius’s remark and Lonergan’s fuller development of it sug-
gest a rather different idea of academic rigor than the one often encountered in
today’s academy: namely the practices of skepticism, falsificationism, or the
various hermeneutics of suspicion and deconstruction which tend to turn
researchers and teachers into “Ninja critics,” as O’Reilley (1993, p. 92) has put
it. To be able to carry out the sort of approach suggested by Ignatius, without
abandoning our inquiring spirit, is what is needed to structure real dialogue
about fundamental commitments.
CONCLUSION
This article has not tried to argue that high quality research should play an
important role in Catholic institutions of higher learning. That is already a fore-
gone conclusion. Emphasis on research has already become pervasive through-
out Catholic institutions. Leahy (1991) narrates how Catholic institutions came
to recognize that their ability to attract undergraduate students depended upon
developing graduate programs – and this implied, of course, that they had to
attract faculty members committed to high quality, cutting-edge research (see
also Gleason, 1995). Even in departments that do not offer graduate programs,
research and publication now weigh heavily in hiring and promotion decisions.
As Leahy notes:
Before World War II, Catholic colleges and universities in America had a
clear and compelling sense of purpose: to protect the faith of Catholics and
to make it possible for Catholics to obtain a college education. But changes
in American culture have largely dissolved the former consensus regarding
the nature, characteristics, and meaning of Catholic education. (1991, p.
156)
Certainly the increased emphasis on research in higher education must be count-
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ed among those changes in American culture. For better or worse, students come
to universities because of faculties’ research reputations, and financial survival
will continue to impose the need to hire faculty who are trained in and engaged
in the cutting edge of research. But the challenge to Catholic institutions is to
find ways to integrate research into an enriched sense of mission that retains
older commitments without allowing them to be vitiated by alien concerns.
The loss of faith-related commitments as research increased is precisely
what did happen to the prestigious Protestant universities. Yet as Marsden
(1994) has shown so meticulously, the loss of those faith-related commitments
was not due to research per se, but rather to the fundamental commitments that
framed the context within which research was conducted.
Hence, the concern of this article has been to argue not that research should
be integral to the mission of Catholic higher education, but rather make a con-
tribution to how to think about research as integral to that mission. It will not
suffice to accept the standards and fundamental commitments of research as
conducted in thoroughly secular contexts. This article, therefore, is not so much
arguing that there should be a connection, but exploring ways that might be
done, ways that address Gleason’s call for a replacement for the integral context
of Neoscholasticism. The proposal set forth here is to conceive of the mission of
Catholic institutions of higher education as contributing to “good under con-
struction.” Put simply in terms of Catholic faith, the good under construction is
the result of human contributions to what is ultimately God’s work of creation
and redemption. Borrowing from the work of Bernard Lonergan, the proposal
here is to think about university research itself as participating in the dynamics
of creative, critical inquiry and innovation, of bias, and of love that heals the
destructiveness of bias. The secularization of the Protestant universities took
place, Marsden argues, because critical inquiry was conducted within the con-
fines of Enlightenment’s fundamental assumptions, assumptions that blinded
them to the insidious subtleties of bias and the transformative power of loving
grace. Integrating the latter two with the first is the challenge for Catholic insti-
tutions.
This article, therefore, has endeavored to establish five important points.
First, Gleason is correct in saying that the most important challenge before us is
the development of an integral vision for Catholic higher education that does for
the 21st century what Neoscholasticism did for a time at the beginning of the
20th century. Second, such a vision must include the research dimension of the
Catholic university as well as the commitments to student instruction, formation,
service, and social justice. Third, a profitable approach toward this new integral
vision is in terms of the various ways that the research efforts of university fac-
ulty contribute to or corrupt the good under construction of human history.
Fourth, the reflection upon academic research in its relation to the historical
good under construction is achieved through exercises of self-appropriation and
discernment of methods of inquiry, of the subtle biases that have been acquired,
and of the ways that love, unconditional and otherwise, has upon the work of
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research, teaching and student formation. And finally, such efforts of self-appro-
priation are aided by interdisciplinary conversations that include some sort of
structured, methodical way of dialoguing about fundamental commitments.
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